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A NON-COMPETE CASE IS AN ANTITRUST CASE:
AN ANALYSIS OF OKLAHOMA’S POSTEMPLOYMENT RESTRAINT LAW
HON. JOHN F. FISCHER
Introduction
Too often, courts treat non-compete agreements in employment contracts
as unenforceable then attempt to determine if the agreement fits one of the
statutory exceptions. This tendency is natural given the language of title 15,
section 217 of the Oklahoma Statutes: “Every contract by which any one is
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any
kind . . . is to that extent void.”1 An employment contract by which an
employee agrees not to compete with the employer after termination of the
employment relationship is certainly a “contract by which . . . one is
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business.” 2 But not
every such agreement is “to that extent void.” 3 Both statutory and judicial
exceptions allow some of these agreements to be enforceable. 4 The nonstatutory exceptions are a consequence of the judiciary’s long and evolving
history with this area of the law. Ultimately, they are compelled by state
and federal antitrust law, as well as economic policy inherited from the
English common law.
 Judge on the Court of Civil Appeals of the State of Oklahoma. © John F. Fischer
2018. The author thanks his judicial assistants Cristina Romero and Tosha Sharp who
provided their customary thoughtful review and comment.
1. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217 (2011).
2. Id.; see also Neal v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 1970 OK 13, ¶ 6, 480 P.2d 923, 924 (noting
employees’ agreement not to compete with employer for one year after termination of
employment “restrains the plaintiffs from pursuing a lawful profession”).
3. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217.
4. See, e.g., id. § 218 (creating an exception as to sale of good will of a business); id. §
219 (dissolving a partnership); id. § 219A (soliciting the business of established customers
of the former employer); 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219B (Supp. 2013) (soliciting co-workers to
leave a former employer); see also Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana,
2002 OK 27, 61 P.3d 210 (accepting referrals of business, including former customers, from
non-parties to the contract); Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 1989 OK 122, ¶ 18, 780
P.2d 1168, 1175 (accepting the business of former clients “[w]here no active solicitation has
occurred”); Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, 465 P.2d 448
(soliciting the business of former clients with respect to products or services not sold by the
former employer). Whether the judicial exceptions survived the enactment of section 219A
has not been addressed.
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This Article demonstrates the antitrust nature of non-compete issues—
that all cases involve some application of the antitrust law’s rule of
reason5—and argues that beginning to analyze non-compete agreements
with the statutory exceptions to section 217 leads to the “dark woods”6 of
statutory construction. In addition, this Article explores the issues that the
2001 enactment of title 15 section 219A created for legal practitioners who
draft non-compete agreements. Of particular focus is the effect of this
statute on the long-settled holdings in Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident
Insurance Co.7 and Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard,8 and the antitrust
analysis of post-employment restraints employed in those cases. Both cases
had established additional exceptions to section 217 and interpreted the
statute pursuant to a test of reasonableness. This Article argues for an
interpretation of section 219A that is consistent with the following: (1) the
case law existing at the time the statute was enacted, and (2) the rule of
reason that the Oklahoma Supreme Court previously adopted when
interpreting section 217.
I. The Historical Perspective
For three reasons, it is particularly important for practitioners who work
with post-employment restraints to understand the history of this body of
law. First, the guild system from which restrictive covenant law originated
is, to some extent, still with us. Modern corporations descended from the
medieval guilds, and some guilds—bar associations, for example—remain
to this day. Second, the historical perspective provides an opportunity to
catalogue the development of exceptions to the general common law rule,
which at one point prohibited all post-employment restraints. From that
perspective, it becomes apparent that the relevant considerations are not
much different today than they were three hundred years ago. In addition,
the English courts’ focus on the reasonableness of the restraint when
developing the common law supports application of the rule of reason in
these cases. Third, the common law history explains the evolution of the

5. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (holding that
antitrust laws are interpreted pursuant to the common law “standard of reason”).
6. “Midway on our life’s journey, I found myself / In dark woods, the right road lost.”
DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO OF DANTE canto I, 3 (Robert Pinsky trans., Farrar, Straus &
Giroux 1994) (1320).
7. 1970 OK 27, ¶ 12, 465 P.2d 448, 452.
8. 1989 OK 122, ¶ 11, 780 P.2d 1168, 1171.
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economic context in which early non-compete cases were decided—from
the guild system to a free market economy.
A. The Guild System
It is commonly accepted that all contracts restricting an individual’s
ability to practice a lawful trade or profession were illegal at common law. 9
As the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized: “At first agreements in
restraint of trade were those made by craftsmen and tradesmen having only
a localized trade or business, and at a time when a craftsman was required
to follow only his trade, and at that time the law permitted no restraint.” 10
As Blackstone noted, prior to the development of the guild system “every
man might use what trade he pleased.” 11 But Blackstone recognized that the
Statute of Apprentices, passed in 1563, essentially revoked the freedom to
practice any trade.12 That statute limited an apprenticeship to seven years
but granted the exclusive right to practice a trade to those who had
completed an apprenticeship. 13
During the height of the medieval guild system, guilds received patents
from the sovereign. 14 These patents essentially granted a monopoly over a
particular trade because only guild members could practice the trade
9. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51 (“Originally all such contracts were considered to
be illegal, because it was deemed they were injurious to the public as well as to the
individuals who made them. In the interest of the freedom of individuals to contract, this
doctrine was modified so that it was only when a restraint by contract was so general as to be
coterminous with the kingdom that it was treated as void.”). But see Harlan M. Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630–32 (1960) (noting that
statement was derived from four cases decided between 1414 and 1711 involving
“unethical” masters who were attempting to extend the traditional period of indenture by
apprentices and journeymen and, thereby, interfering with their right to practice a particular
trade or engage in a particular business). Blake argues, with good reason, that the statement
is true only as it relates to restraints on future employment that were inconsistent with the
custom and practice in guilds regarding the rules for apprenticeships. Id. at 632–34.
10. Wesley v. Chandler, 1931 OK 477, ¶ 6, 3 P.2d 720, 722 (quoting the petition).
11. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *427.
12. Id. (citing Statute of Artificers 1563, 5 Eliz. 1 c. 4, § 31).
13. Statute of Artificers § 31; see also Blake, supra note 9, at 633 (“In 1563, the Statute
of Apprentices made a seven-year apprentice period mandatory, but long before its
enactment this period had been required by most of the guilds.”) (footnote omitted).
14. Carlo Marco Belfanti, Guilds, Patents, and the Circulation of Technical Knowledge:
Northern Italy During the Early Modern Age, 45 TECH. & CULTURE 569, 577 (2004) (“The
guilds’ tendency to slow progress down was balanced by the ability of city councils and
princes to grant patents . . . .”).
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associated with that guild.15 And only masters were admitted as members,
after having served a lengthy apprenticeship. 16 Guild members then
restricted access to knowledge of the trade, the raw materials necessary to
produce the end product, and the markets in which the product could be
sold. 17 As a result, it was difficult to practice a trade outside the framework
of a guild. This result was “looked upon as a hard law, or as a beneficial
one, according to the prevailing humor of the times.” 18
Blackstone described apprentices as a class of servants, usually bound
for a term of years “to serve their masters, and be maintained and instructed
by them.”19 In exchange for this maintenance and instruction, the rules of
service protected guild masters’ interests; during the apprenticeship, the
master enjoyed the exclusive benefits of the apprentice’s labor without
having to pay wages.20 And the anti-competitive rule against practicing a
profession without having served an apprenticeship protected the interest of
the apprentice.21 Blackstone also noted that supporters of the Statute of
Apprentices responded to the criticism that it tended to create monopolies
with a pernicious effect on trade by pointing out that the guild system
provided employment opportunities for the youth and created skilled
workers, both of which generally benefitted trade and the public. 22
In the first reported non-compete case, John Dyer agreed that he would
not practice his craft of dyeing fabric in the town of his former master for
six months following the conclusion of his apprenticeship and gave a bond
to secure that promise.23 When Dyer’s former master sued to enforce the
terms of the agreement, the court not only denied relief but also stated that
15. See id.
16. See Blake, supra note 9, at 633.
17. Belfanti, supra note 14, at 572–76.
18. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *427.
19. Id. at *426.
20. Id.; see also Blake, supra note 9, at 633 (“A corollary of the long period of training,
in which wages as such were either nonexistent or nominal, was that at its end the apprentice
was to be free as a journeyman to practice his trade for hire wherever he chose until he could
gain entry to the inner circle of craftsmen.”).
21. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *428 (“[N]o one would be induced to undergo a
seven years’ servitude, if others, though equally skillful, were allowed the same advantages
without having undergone the same discipline . . . .”).
22. Id. (“But another of their arguments goes much further; viz., that apprenticeships are
useful to the commonwealth, by employing of youth, and learning them to be early
industrious . . . .”).
23. Dyer’s Case, YB 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, pl. 26 (1414) (Eng.); see also Blake, supra note 9,
at 635 n.32 (citing Dyer’s Case, YB 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, pl. 26).
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had the master been present in court when the case was heard, the judge
would have thrown the master in jail. 24 The master was entitled to Dyer’s
exclusive service during the period of his apprenticeship. 25 But once the
apprenticeship ended, Dyer was free to practice his trade without further
restraint from his master.26
Discontent with post-employment restraints traces its roots to two early
concerns with the guild system. First, the community would be deprived of
the services of any apprentice prevented from working, and it was likely the
apprentice would then become a public charge. Second, enforcement of
covenants against practicing a given profession outside the guild would
concentrate the benefits of the monopoly in relatively few masters.27 But
these “medieval economic ideals” 28 existed within a mercantile economy
that eventually gave way to the industrial revolution. And the evolving
public policy in England favoring a capitalist economy required a more
“unrestrained” view of non-competition agreements to facilitate a
developing free market economy. 29 Not surprisingly, Adam Smith, the
founding father of capitalism, was a critic of the guild system and argued
that it restrained “free competition.” 30
It is therefore understandable that courts’ antagonism to postemployment restraints began to wane during the three hundred years after
Dyer’s Case.31 Decided in 1711, Mitchel v. Reynolds32 “is . . . the starting
place for the modern law of restraints in employment contracts.”33 In
Mitchel, the court enforced an agreement not to compete against the seller
of a bakery business because the buyer acquired the existing location and
24. Bill C. Berger, From Dyer’s Case to Hard Bargains: Six Centuries of Covenants
Not to Compete, COLO. LAW., Apr. 2007, at 39, 39.
25. See Blake, supra note 9, at 633, 636.
26. See id.
27. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898)
(“The other [objection to restraints] was that such restraints tended to give the covenantee,
the beneficiary of such restraints, a monopoly of the trade, from which he had thus excluded
one competitor, and by the same mean might exclude others.”), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
28. Wesley v. Chandler, 1931 OK 477, ¶ 7, 3 P.2d 720, 722.
29. East-India Co. v. Sandys (1685) 10 St. Tr. 371 (Eng.).
30. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 101 (Sálvio Marcelo Soares ed., MetaLibri Digital Library 2007) (1776),
http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf.
31. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911).
32. (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 1 P. Wms. 181.
33. Blake, supra note 9, at 637.
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the business’s existing customers.34 The court balanced the seller’s interest
in continuing to practice his trade against the buyer’s expectation of
purchasing an ongoing business and concluded that enforcing the
agreement was beneficial to the public. 35 “[A] man may, upon a valuable
consideration, by his own consent, and for his own profit, give over his
trade; and part with it to another . . . .”36 The court also considered the
significance of the economic impact that a contrary decision might have;
forcing buyers to risk future competition from sellers would reduce the
sales prices that sellers could obtain. 37 Mitchel was also the first case in
which a court made the important distinction between a “general” and
“particular” (or ancillary) restraint, a distinction carried forward into
modern antitrust law.38
By the end of the nineteenth century, judicial attitudes had evolved even
further. In Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore, the United States
Supreme Court noted that Mitchel v. Reynolds was decided in the following
way:
[U]nder a condition of things, and a state of society, different
from those which now prevail, the rule laid down is not regarded
as inflexible, and has been considerably modified. Public welfare
is first considered, and, if it be not involved, and the restraint
upon one party is not greater than protection to the other party
requires, the contract may be sustained.39
And in the time since Gibbs, this focus on the effect that a particular
restraint has on the public has become the central theme in antitrust
analysis. As the Court later recognized, “[i]t is axiomatic that the antitrust
laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’”40
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has similarly recognized the importance of
promoting the public interest: “The fundamental test of the reasonableness
of restraint is its effect on the public.” 41
34. Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 347, 1 P. Wms. at 181.
35. Id. at 348–50, 1 P. Wms. at 182–88.
36. Id. at 349, 1 P. Wms. at 186.
37. Id. at 350–51, 1 P. Wms. at 190–91.
38. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shawnee Compress Co., 1906 OK 64, ¶ 7, 87 P. 315, 318.
39. 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889).
40. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993)
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
41. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 15, 561 P.2d 499,
506 (citing Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 1938)).
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As new exceptions to the general common law rule developed,
employees were no longer bound to serve a lengthy apprenticeship without
pay, and employers were no longer protected by the exclusive license of the
guild system. 42 This shift came after society and courts came to recognize
that enforcing certain covenants to restrain trade could actually be
beneficial to trade. 43 In order to incentivize business owners to hire the best
employees and train them, employers needed tools through which they
could prevent those employees from “set[ting] up a rival business in the
vicinity after learning the details and secrets of the business.”44 Employers
were permitted to condition employment on post-employment restraints as
long as they were no more restrictive than necessary to protect the
employer’s legitimate interests and were not otherwise injurious to the
public interest.45 Stated differently, if the post-employment restraint was
merely secondary to the main purpose of an otherwise legitimate
employment contract and did not tend to create the adverse economic
impact resulting from common law monopolies, it was enforceable. 46
B. The Common Law Exceptions
Since Mitchel was decided in 1711, five exceptions to the common law
ban on employment restraints have been recognized:
[C]ovenants in partial restraint of trade are generally upheld as
valid when they are agreements (1) by the seller of property or
business not to compete with the buyer in such a way as to
derogate from the value of the property or business sold; (2) by a
retiring partner not to compete with the firm; (3) by a partner
pending the partnership not to do anything to interfere, by
competition or otherwise, with the business of the firm; (4) by
the buyer of property not to use the same in competition with the
business retained by the seller; and (5) by an assistant, servant,

42. Blake, supra note 9, at 638.
43. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) (“After a
time it became apparent to the people and the courts that it was in the interest of trade that
certain covenants in restraint of trade should be enforced.”), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
44. Id. at 281.
45. Horner v. Graves (1831) 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 7 Bing. 735.
46. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282.
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or agent not to compete with his master or employer after the
expiration of his time to service. 47
With respect to these exceptions, courts focus their analysis on the
purpose of a particular restraint and whether it is “such only as to afford a
fair protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given, and
not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public.” 48 The historical
case law determined that these five categories of restraints could be
enforced without threatening the pernicious effect on trade that had resulted
from the creation of monopolies. 49
II. The Antitrust Issues
The “evils” of the monopoly include the monopolist’s ability to engage
in the following activities: (1) fixing a price injurious to the public; (2)
raising prices by limiting production; and (3) reducing quality while
maintaining prices. 50 Over time, agreements that artificially fixed the price
of goods or services, limited the availability of those goods or services, or
reduced their quality came to be known as contracts “in restraint of trade.” 51
As the Supreme Court recognized in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp., “[t]he term ‘restraint of trade’ in the [Sherman Act], like
the term at common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements, but to
a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite
different sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances.” 52
Modern federal antitrust law began with the Sherman Act, 53 which was
enacted in 1890 and intended “to be a comprehensive charter of economic
47. Id. at 281.
48. Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. [1894] AC 535, 567
(HL) (UK). More recent cases have cited this nineteenth century approach with approval.
See Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 281; Wesley v. Chandler, 1931 OK 477, ¶ 10, 3 P.2d 720, 722.
49. See Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282 (“It would be stating it too strongly to say that these
five classes of covenants in restraint of trade include all of those upheld as valid at the
common law; but it would certainly seem to follow from the tests laid down for determining
the validity of such an agreement that no conventional restraint of trade can be enforced
unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful
contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the full enjoyment of the legitimate
fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by
the other party.”).
50. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911).
51. Id. at 54.
52. 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018).
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liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade.”54 Sherman Act protections, like antitrust laws generally, represent
“the Magna Carta of free enterprise” 55 by protecting commerce from undue
restraints.56 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides as follows: “Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”57
But every contract restrains trade to some extent. 58 Consequently, like
the English court in Mitchel v. Reynolds,59 the Supreme Court first
announced in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States that the
Sherman Act should be interpreted pursuant to “the standard of reason
which had been applied at the common law.”60 And the Court gave the
classic statement of this rule of reason in Board of Trade of Chicago v.
United States: “The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.” 61
Application of the rule requires analyzing “facts peculiar to the business
in which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects,
and the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption.” 62
A rule of reason analysis thus involves three considerations: (1) the
relevant market (determined by the products and geographical area affected
by the restraint);63 (2) the effect of the restraint on competition in that

54. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
55. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
56. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (“The statute under
this view evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts,
whether resulting from combinations or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain interstate
or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by methods,
whether old or new, which would constitute an interference,—that is, an undue restraint.”).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
58. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.”).
59. (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 1 P. Wms. 181.
60. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.
61. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
62. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972) (citing Bd. of Trade,
246 U.S. at 238).
63. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–72 (1966); see also Teleco, Inc.
v. Ford Indus., Inc., 1978 OK 159, ¶¶ 12–13, 587 P.2d 1360, 1364 (adopting the same
analysis for Oklahoma antitrust law).
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market; 64 and (3) any pro-competitive benefits that outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the restraint.65
A. Oklahoma Antitrust Law
Oklahoma’s general antitrust statute was originally enacted in 1910 and
later renumbered in title 79.66 That statute was repealed in 1998 67 and
recodified—without change—in the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act. 68 The
statute provides: “Every act, agreement, contract, or combination in the
form of a trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce within this state is hereby declared to be against public policy
and illegal.”69
Prior to the adoption of the Antitrust Reform Act, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court generally used federal antitrust law to resolve Oklahoma
antitrust issues.70 For example, in the 1950s, the Supreme Court established
that certain restraints are so injurious to competition that “because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue [they]
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.” 71 Oklahoma followed suit
in the 1970s when it recognized that certain restraints constitute a per se
violation of Oklahoma’s antitrust law.72
64. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).
65. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979); see
also Beville v. Curry, 2001 OK 1, ¶ 12, 39 P.3d 754, 759 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978)) (“Our analysis must proceed under the ‘rule of
reason,’ which prohibits restraints only if the adverse effects on overall competition
outweigh the pro-competitive benefits of the restraint.”).
66. See 79 OKLA. STAT. § 1 (superseded 1998). For the history of pre-statehood antitrust
law, see State ex rel. Dabney v. Wm. Cameron & Co., Inc., 1930 OK 583, ¶¶ 8–16, 294 P.
104, 105.
67. Repealed by 1998 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 356, § 14 (effective July 1, 1998).
68. 79 OKLA. STAT. §§ 201–212 (2011).
69. Id. § 203(A). The statute is similar but not identical to the Sherman Act. By
including every “act” within the statute’s proscription, some unilateral conduct was
prohibited in contrast to only concerted action prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Compare id. with 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). Based on that distinction, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed an antitrust judgment based on unilateral conduct that
violated Oklahoma’s antitrust statute. See Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc.,
82 F.3d 1533, 1550–51 (10th Cir. 1996).
70. See, e.g., Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 1978 OK 159, ¶ 3, 587 P.2d 1360, 1362;
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 14 n.13, 561 P.2d 499, 505
n.13.
71. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
72. See Teleco, ¶ 8, 587 P.2d at 1363.
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In addition, antitrust analysis often distinguishes between a “horizontal
restraint” and a “vertical restraint.” A “vertical restraint” involves “persons
at different levels of the market structure.”73 One common example of a
vertical arrangement would be a contract between a manufacturer and
distributor, or a wholesaler and retailer.74 Each performs a different
function but ultimately serves the same customers. In contrast, a “horizontal
restraint” involves “an agreement between competitors at the same level of
the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize
competition.”75
The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly adopted the federal rule of
reason to use when interpreting the general antitrust statute in 1977.76 Much
of this Article focuses on the antitrust rule used for the interpretation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act 77 and its Oklahoma counterpart, title 79,
section 203(A).78 The Oklahoma Supreme Court is well acquainted with
that rule, its definitional concepts, and the required analysis. 79
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s policy of relying on federal antitrust
law has now been codified as part of the Reform Act. Under this statute,
“[t]he provisions of this act shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with
Federal Antitrust Law 15 U.S.C., Section 1 et seq. and the case law
applicable thereto.”80

73. Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, 1981 OK 104, ¶ 10, 640 P.2d 948, 950 (quoting
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)). Ultimately, Crown Paint
rejected the argument that an agreement between a manufacturer and its distributor
constituted a horizontal restraint. Id. ¶ 12, 640 P.2d at 951.
74. See id. ¶¶ 10, 24, 640 P.2d at 950, 951.
75. Id. ¶ 10, 640 P.2d at 950 (quoting Topco, 405 U.S. at 608).
76. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 15, 561 P.2d 499,
506 (citing Topco, 405 U.S. at 596).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
78. 79 OKLA. STAT. § 203(A) (2011).
79. See, e.g., Crown Paint, ¶¶ 9–12, 640 P.2d at 950–51 (rejecting argument that the
contract was a per se violation and applying a rule of reason analysis to determine validity of
vertical restraint) (citing and discussing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958); Topco, 405 U.S. at 608); Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 1978 OK 159, ¶ 21, 587
P.2d 1360, 1365 (determining the relevant product market and the absence of a submarket)
(citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 401 (1956)).
80. 79 OKLA. STAT. § 212.
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B. Oklahoma’s Employment Related Antitrust Law
Clearly, a non-compete covenant in an employment agreement is a
“contract . . . in restraint of trade” in terms of both federal 81 and Oklahoma
antitrust law.82 Apparently, however, non-compete agreements in
Oklahoma employment contracts are entitled to a special place in Dante’s
Inferno. They even have their own statute. Title 15, section 217 provides as
follows: “Every contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a
lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as provided
by [sections 218, 219, 219A and 219B] of this title, . . . is to that extent
void.”83 The first Oklahoma Legislature enacted section 217 in 1908, and its
original language has largely endured, barring a minor amendment in
2001.84 Further, the substantive language of section 217 is identical to the
statute in effect in the Oklahoma Territory immediately prior to the
enactment of section 217.85
It is significant that the restraint of trade language included in section
217 was identical to the statute that had been enacted for the Oklahoma
Territory at the same time as the Sherman Act, which prohibited contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. 86 As the Supreme Court
recognized in Standard Oil, “where words are employed in a statute which
had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this
country, they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the
context compels to the contrary.”87 And, that was the approach followed “in

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

15 U.S.C. § 1.
79 OKLA. STAT. § 203.
15 OKLA. STAT. § 217 (2011).
2001 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 406, § 3.
Compare 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217, with 1 WILSON’S REVISED AND ANNOTATED
STATUTES OF OKLAHOMA 317 (1903) (“Every contract by which any one is restrained from
exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as provided by
the next two sections, is to that extent void.”).
86. W. A. MCCARTNEY, JOHN H. BEATTY & J. MALCOLM JOHNSTON, THE STATUTES OF
OKLAHOMA, 1893, at 220 (Guthrie, Oklahoma State Capital Printing Co., 1893) (“Every
contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or
business of any kind, otherwise than as provided by the next two sections, is to that extent
void.”).
87. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) (citing Swearingen
v. United States, 161 U.S. 446 (1896); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898); Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434 (1899); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 126
(1904)).
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the Indian Territory prior to statehood, where the common law relating to
contracts governed.”88
There is no discord in the authorities that, where the
[employment] restraint is no more extensive as to area than the
protection of the party with whom the contract is made
reasonably requires, the public not being likely to be injured by
such an agreement, every other person being at liberty to practice
within such limits, such contract is reasonable and valid, unless
otherwise vitiated. 89
Nonetheless, section 217 and its predecessor were viewed as changing
the common law rule. 90 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted in Bayly,
Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, “the common law rules which analyzed
covenants not to compete based on their reasonableness did not survive the
enactment of §§ 217–219.”91 Oklahoma adopted only two of the five
common law exceptions to the prohibition on restraints of trade.92 Those
two exceptions include: (1) agreements by the seller of a business not to
compete with the buyer93 and (2) agreements by partners dissolving a
partnership to cease carrying on the business of the partnership. 94
As a result, an employer in the new State of Oklahoma was prohibited
from preventing a former employee from setting up a “rival business,” even
though employers in the Indian Territory had been able to do so under
Addyston Pipe’s common law rule. 95 This literal interpretation prevailed in
88. Threlkeld v. Steward, 1909 OK 203, ¶ 6, 103 P. 630, 631 (enforcing an agreement
by a physician who sold his medical practice not to practice medicine in the same area for
two years).
89. Id. ¶ 5, 103 P. at 631.
90. Hulen v. Earel, 1903 OK 76, ¶ 9, 73 P. 927, 930 (refusing to enforce an agreement
by one departing partner not to practice medicine in the vicinity of the remaining partner’s
practice because it did not fit the statutory exceptions to the predecessor of 15 OKLA. STAT. §
217 (2011)). “But, no matter what may be the rule in other states governing this class of
contracts, we have a statute which governs such contracts in this [Oklahoma] territory.” Id. ¶
6, 73 P. at 930.
91. 1989 OK 122, ¶ 10, 780 P.2d 1168, 1171.
92. See John F. Fischer, II, Antitrust Law in Oklahoma, 48 JOURNAL [OKLA. B.J.] 413,
420 (1977).
93. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 218 (2011).
94. Id. § 219.
95. Cf. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); E.S. Miller Labs., Inc. v. Griffin, 1948 OK 149, ¶ 8, 194 P.2d
877, 879.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

768

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:755

the only two early section 217 cases that did not involve the sale of
goodwill or the dissolution of a partnership. 96 In both cases, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court failed to consider the reasonableness of the postemployment restraint or the effect on competition if the restraint was
enforced.
Early cases viewed section 217 as providing a “rigid” rule that prohibited
every contract limiting an individual’s freedom of employment, subject
only to the two statutory exceptions. 97 Courts apparently assumed that the
employment contract, which effectively (if not expressly) restrained an
employee from practicing a lawful trade or profession for a competitor
during the term of employment, was not one of those prohibited by section
217. But they did not interpret the term “every” in section 217 in the same
manner as the term “every” in title 79, section 1.98
However, in 1970, the Oklahoma Supreme Court began to abandon its
rigid interpretation of section 217. In Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident
Insurance Co., the court enforced a narrowly drawn non-compete
agreement that prevented a departing insurance salesmen from selling the
same lines of insurance to his former employer’s customers for two years. 99
In doing so, the court distinguished the health and accident insurance
policies that the former employee previously sold from all other types of
insurance.100 This analysis is consistent with determining that a relevant
“submarket” (i.e., health and accident policies) existed and therefore made
it unnecessary to determine the effect of the restraint on the market for all
insurance products.
96. See Neal v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 1970 OK 13, 480 P.2d 923 (invalidating a provision in
an insurance salesman’s employment contract preventing him from going to work for any
other insurance company in the same territory for a period of one year); E.S. Miller Labs.,
1948 OK 149, 194 P.2d 877 (invalidating a provision in a pharmaceutical salesman’s
employment contract that prevented him from going to work for any other pharmaceutical
company in the same territory for a period of two years); see also A.W. Gans, Annotation,
Statutes Prohibiting Restraint on Profession, Trade, or Business as Applicable to
Restrictions in Employment or Agency Contracts, 3 A.L.R.2d 522 (1949).
97. See Wesley v. Chandler, 1931 OK 477, ¶ 8, 3 P.2d 720, 722.
98. Compare E.S. Miller Labs., ¶ 11, 194 P.2d at 879 (finding that a territorial restraint
for a period of two years in a pharmaceutical salesman’s employment contract violated 15
OKLA. STAT. 217 (1941)), with Thomas v. Belcher, 1939 OK 142, ¶ 4, 87 P.2d 1084, 1085
(finding that an agreement between a wholesaler and a retailer limiting the retailer to a
specific territory was not unreasonable or a violation of 15 OKLA. STAT. 217 (1931)).
99. 1970 OK 27, ¶¶ 7, 12, 465 P.2d 448, 450–51.
100. Id. ¶ 8, 465 P.2d at 451.
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The non-compete agreement in Tatum did not prevent the employee from
selling other lines of insurance to his former employer’s existing customers;
nor did it prohibit the employee from selling any line of insurance to any
individual who was not a customer of his former employer. 101 The noncompete agreement merely required the employee “to maintain a ‘handsoff’ policy with respect to those whom he knows are ‘insureds’ under thenoutstanding group policies, or franchise policies, of health and/or accident
insurance issued by the plaintiff company.” 102
Given this limited restraint, the court concluded that the agreement was
only intended to prevent the employee from using company information
that he received and customer relationships that he developed for a
reasonable period of time after the employment ended. 103 Unlike the
agreements that were invalidated in Miller Laboratories and Neal, the
agreement in Tatum did not otherwise prevent him from competing with his
former employer. 104 As a result, the court held that the restrictive covenant
did “not, in any manner or to any extent whatsoever, restrain the defendant
from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind
whatsoever, either in competition with the plaintiff or otherwise.”105
Seven years later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court further eroded its rigid
interpretation of section 217. In Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma v. NCAA, the court applied a rule of reason analysis to find that a
contract provision between a university and an athletic association that
limited the number of coaches the university could hire did not violate
Oklahoma’s general antitrust law.106 And the court also rejected the
argument that the contract violated section 217. 107 The court found that the
contract did not prevent the coaches from practicing their trade or
profession, but instead merely limited the number of coaches the university
could hire.108 The court reasoned that “[a]n agreement which is reasonable
and proper and which the parties have a right to make is not void as

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. ¶ 7, 465 P.2d at 451.
Id. ¶ 8, 465 P.2d at 451.
Id. ¶ 7, 465 P.2d at 451.
Id.
1977 OK 17, ¶ 17, 561 P.2d 499, 506–07.
Id. ¶ 19, 561 P.2d at 508.
Id.
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contrary to public policy even though contractual duties toward third parties
may be incidentally involved.”109
In Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, the Oklahoma Supreme Court again
considered the argument that a contractual restraint violated both title 79,
section 1 and title 15, section 217. 110 Crown Paint involved a contract
between a paint manufacturer and one of its wholesale distributors in which
the manufacturer agreed not to sell paint to the wholesaler’s retail
customers.111 Although the manufacturer argued that a contract prohibiting
it from selling paint to the wholesaler’s customers was illegal, the court
held that the contract did not violate title 79, section 1. 112 The court
reasoned that it was a reasonable “vertical” restraint between companies at
different levels of the market structure, not a “horizontal” market division
agreement between competitors.113 The court also found that the contract
did not violate section 217.114 After reviewing Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, the court held “that not all restraints of
trade are outlawed by 15 O.S. 1971 § 217. Only those restraints which are
unreasonable are outlawed.”115
Finally, in Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court formally adopted the antitrust rule of reason that had previously been
applied to title 79, section 1 for section 217 cases. 116 “Although the rule of
reason . . . had been incorporated as a matter of law into agreements falling
within the parameters of 79 O.S. 1981 § 1, its application to § 217 was
questionable before the Crown Paint and NCAA decisions.”117
109. Id. (citing Gulf Refining Co. v. Boren, 50 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)).
110. 1981 OK 104, ¶ 4, 640 P.2d 948, 949.
111. Id. ¶ 1, 640 P.2d at 949.
112. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11–12, 640 P.2d at 950–51.
113. Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 640 P.2d at 951.
114. Id. ¶¶ 23–24, 640 P.2d at 952.
115. Id. ¶ 23, 640 P.2d at 952.
116. 1989 OK 122, ¶¶ 11–12, 780 P.2d 1168, 1170–71.
117. Id. ¶ 11, 780 P.2d at 1171 (footnotes omitted). Neither Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma nor Crown Paint involved a contract between an employer and an
employee in the traditional sense. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma involved
a contract between an employer and a third-party which limited the number of employees the
employer could hire. 1977 OK 17, ¶ 17, 561 P.2d 499, 506–07. Crown Paint involved a
contract between a principal and an independent agent not subject to the principal’s control
necessary to create an employer/employee relationship. Crown Paint, ¶ 1, 640 P.2d at 949.
But section 217 is not limited to contracts between employers and employees. It addresses
“every contract” that restrains one from exercising a lawful trade or profession. See Robert
C. Smith, Jr., Contracts, 4 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 193, 210–13 (1979).
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The next section discusses the difference between the antitrust rule of
reason and the version of the “rule of reason” that appears in the
Restatement of Contracts.118 Despite the differences, it is clear that the
Bayly court was referring to the antitrust rule, rather than the Restatement
version. First, although the dissent described the rule of reason in
Restatement terms, 119 the majority adopted a different view. 120 Although the
majority cited section 515 of the Restatement of Contracts (1932) for the
proposition that the rule of reason may be altered by statute, it did not cite
or discuss section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts relied on
by the dissent.121
Second, the Bayly court cited three United States Supreme Court cases to
support its holding.122 All three of those cases hold that the antitrust version
of the rule of reason applies to section 1 of the Sherman Act. 123 The court
also cited Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Industries, Inc., in which the Oklahoma
Supreme Court expressly adopted the Sherman Act’s rule of reason and its
“relevant market analysis.”124
As a result, the rule of reason determines the enforceability of postemployment restraints after Bayly. And, further, there is no practical
difference between those covenants and contracts challenged under title 79,
section 203. Therefore, the Oklahoma rule of reason cases decided pursuant
to section 203 and its predecessor (section 1) are relevant to the rule of
reason analysis when courts decide the enforceability of post-employment
restraints pursuant to section 217.

118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1)(a)–(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(commenting that the promise is a violation if “(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to
protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the
hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public”).
119. Bayly, ¶ 2, 780 P.2d at 1176 (Opala, V.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“A restraint is deemed reasonable only if it (1) is no greater than is required for the
employer’s protection, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee and (3) is not
injurious to the public.”) (footnote omitted).
120. Id. ¶¶ 10–12, 780 P.2d at 1170–73.
121. See id. ¶ 11 & n.8, 780 P.2d at 1171 & n.8.
122. Id. ¶ 11 & n.7, 780 P.2d at 1171 & n.7 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386 (1956); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106, 181 (1911); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64 (1911)).
123. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 386–87; Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 180–82; Standard
Oil, 221 U.S. at 64–65.
124. 1978 OK 159, ¶¶ 12–13, 587 P.2d 1360, 1364, cited in Bayly, ¶ 11 n.7, 780 P.2d at
1171 n.7.
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C. The Restatement Analysis
The “reasonableness” of a post-employment restraint is not to be
confused with its “fairness” to the employee because “[m]ere unfair
competition, without more, does not violate antitrust laws.”125 However,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 188 states that an employment
restraint is unreasonable if (1) it “is greater than is needed to protect the
[employer’s] legitimate interest, or” (2) “the [employer’s] need is
outweighed by the hardship to the [employee] and the likely injury to the
public.”126
Although the Restatement uses the term “rule of reason,” 127 it is not the
same rule of reason analysis used in antitrust cases. The two rules differ
most notably in two facets. First, the Restatement does not require courts to
conduct a relevant market analysis or balance the procompetitive and
anticompetitive economic effects that a restraint has on the relevant market.
Second, the Restatement uniquely considers the hardship an employee faces
due to the restraint whereas hardship on the employee will not sanction an
agreement which otherwise violates the antitrust laws. 128
As the Introductory Note to the Restraint of Trade topic states, noncompete agreements “are governed by extensive federal and state”
legislation, and federal antitrust law “has so completely occupied the field
as to make the common law rules of little or no consequence except as they
125. Beville v. Curry, 2001 OK 1, ¶ 27, 39 P.3d 754, 764 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). Fairness is generally associated with particular
business practices and methods of competition deemed unfair such as the theft of trade
secrets or the disparagement of a competitor or its products. See Tatum v. Colonial Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, ¶¶ 10–12, 465 P.2d 448, 451–52. These kinds of practices
are specifically precluded by other Oklahoma statutes and do not depend on the existence of
any contract subject to review pursuant to section 217. Id. ¶ 12, 465 P.2d at 452; see also
Unfair Trade Practices Act, 79 OKLA. STAT. § 81 (repealed 1998); Brenner v. Stavinsky,
1939 OK 131, ¶ 17, 88 P.2d 613, 615 (enjoining a former employee, in the absence of any
restrictive covenant, from using the former employer’s customer list to compete after the
employment terminated).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); cf. Teresa L.
Green, Note, The Shifting Landscape of Restrictive Covenants in Oklahoma, 40 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 449, 452 (2015) (advocating reliance on the Restatement “guidelines to help
determine when a restraint becomes unenforceable”).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. a.
128. Id. § 188(1)(b); see, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 681, 698–99 (1978) (holding an ethical ban on competitive bidding among professional
engineers violated Sherman Act).
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may give meaning to some of the more general terms of that legislation.” 129
The Note states that the Restatement discussion is directed at the common
law rules and is not intended to displace aspects of the topic that are
controlled by legislation (and, presumably, the case law interpreting that
legislation). 130
Even so, employee hardship was not even a prohibiting factor under the
later common law rules. At common law, an employer could prevent a
departing employee from competing regardless of any hardship on the
employee if the restraint was otherwise reasonable. 131 The Oklahoma Court
of Appeals has made the following observation on the topic:
The Restatement consideration of the fairness of the restraint
from the employee’s perspective is derived from later common
law cases. This focus . . . minimizes the rule of reason’s concern
with the effect of the restraint on competition . . . . The
“fairness” of particular competitive acts is the specific focus of
other statutes; the “true test of legality” pursuant to a rule of
reason analysis is whether the restraint “merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition.”132
In addition, the Restatement view of injury to the public is “measured
against the urgency of the employer’s claim to protection, rather than
against some extrinsic standard.”133 All post-employment restraints impose
some hardship on the departing employee. But the Restatement’s employee
hardship factor permits “consideration of the personal circumstances of the
restrained employee—his financial circumstances or other factors unrelated
to the employment relationship.”134 As a result, the hardship factor injects
uncertainty into contract enforcement. From the employer’s perspective, the
same post-employment restraint might be enforceable as to one employee
but unenforceable as to that employee’s less fortunate colleague. The
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 2, intro. note.
130. Id.
131. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
132. Inergy Propane, LLC v. Lundy, 2009 OK CIV APP 8, ¶ 31, 219 P.3d 547, 558
(footnotes and citation omitted) (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918)).
133. Blake, supra note 9, at 650.
134. Id.
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hardship factor also forces the court to undertake “a particularly difficult
task of balancing competing interests.”135 In contrast, the antitrust version
of the “[r]ule of [r]eason analysis provides an analytical framework for
consistent application of uniform legal principles to determine what is
‘reasonable’ regardless of the nuances and particularities of the market at
issue.”136
Ultimately, the hardship factor is based on a policy decision that assumes
post-employment restraints result from “unequal bargaining power” and are
made by employees who “give scant attention to the” consequences of their
contracts.137 In this regard, the Restatement view privileges legal protection
of employees over “respect for the power of independent persons to bargain
for, or away, contractual provisions.”138
Nonetheless, the Restatement and antitrust rule of reason would reach the
same result in some cases. For example, an employee who develops a close
relationship with the employer’s customers can be prevented from working
in the same business in the area where the employer’s customers are located
for a reasonable period of time. 139 This is broader than the restraint
approved in Tatum.140 However, in a relevant market, where the employer’s
customers are located in a limited area, this would essentially accomplish
the same result reached in Tatum.141
Likewise, an employee who gains information that is valuable to the
employer’s competitors and who can engage in the same trade or profession
in fields unrelated to the employer’s business can be prevented from
working in the same business as the employer for a reasonable period of
time. 142 The opportunity to practice the same profession, although in a
different field, is consistent with the result in Tatum.
These examples demonstrate the commonality between some aspects of
the Restatement and the rule of reason’s focus on harm to consumers.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. a.
136. Vanguard Envtl. Inc. v. Curler, 2008 OK CIV APP 57, ¶ 16, 190 P.3d 1158, 1165.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g.
138. Berry & Berry Acquisitions v. BFN Props., 2018 OK 27, ¶ 13, 416 P.3d 1061, 1068
(quoting In re Kaufman, 2001 OK 88, ¶ 22, 37 P.3d 845, 855).
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g, illus. 6.
140. 1970 OK 27, ¶¶ 8–10, 465 P.2d 448, 451.
141. Cf. Thayne A. Hedges Reg’l Speech & Hearing Ctr., Inc. v. Baughman, 1998 OK
CIV APP 122, 996 P.2d 939 (holding that an agreement by speech and language pathologist
not to contract with any entity served by employer for two years following termination was
reasonable).
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g, illus. 9.
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Although Restatement section 188 was not intended to control in cases
governed by a statute like section 217, it may, nonetheless, provide useful
insights regarding the enforceability of some post-employment restraints—
at least from a historical perspective. But where the Restatement analysis
departs from the antitrust version of the rule of reason by focusing on harm
to the employee, rather than harm to consumers, Bayly holds that the
antitrust rule controls.143
III. Antitrust Analysis of Post-Employment Restraints
A complete rule of reason analysis is not necessary in every antitrust
case. If the anticompetitive effect of a particular restraint is obvious, an
“abbreviated analysis” dispensing with a detailed relevant market analysis
may be appropriate.144 An abbreviated rule of reason analysis is often
sufficient to determine the legality of a non-compete agreement in an
employment contract. And the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not yet
conducted a complete rule of reason analysis in a section 217 case
involving a non-compete agreement between an employer and an
employee. 145 Nonetheless, the essential purpose of the analysis remains “the
protection of competition, not competitors.”146 “The fundamental test of the
reasonableness of restraint is its effect on the public.” 147 This is no less true
143. See Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 1989 OK 122, ¶ 11, 780 P.2d 1168, 1171–
72 (noting that the “rule of reason” incorporated into agreements subject to 79 OKLA. STAT.
§ 1, now § 203, is incorporated into agreements subject to section 217).
144. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999) (“The obvious anticompetitive
effect that triggers abbreviated analysis has not been shown.”); see also FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986) (holding it unnecessary to precisely define the relevant
market before finding a horizontal agreement to withhold x-rays from customers an
unreasonable restraint of trade); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
109–10 (1984) (“This naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive
justification even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (commenting that the legality of an
agreement among competitors not to discuss prices could be determined without “elaborate
study of the industry”).
145. See, e.g., Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, 273 P.3d 20, vacated on
other grounds, 568 U.S. 17 (2012) (per curiam) (holding that any deviation from the
statutory exception in 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A invalidates the restraint).
146. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224–25
(1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (emphasis
removed).
147. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 15, 561 P.2d 499,
506 (citing Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 1938)).
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for section 217, which “was adopted for the protection of individuals
engaged in lawful professions, trades, and business, and for the benefit of
the public.”148 In other words, for a “[r]estraint of trade to be illegal”
pursuant to section 217, it “must be inimical to the public interest.”149
Economic analysis supports this focus on harm to the public. The
evolution of the enforcement of antitrust laws has been “heavily driven . . .
by antitrust economics.”150 The last one hundred years of antitrust case law
shows “a consensus that guidance must be sought in economics” and that

148. Neil v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 1970 OK 172, ¶ 8, 474 P.2d 961, 963.
149. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., ¶ 19, 561 P.2d at 508 (citing Richardson v.
Paxten Co., 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (Va. 1962)); cf. Graham v. Hudgins, Thompson, Ball &
Assocs., Inc., 1975 OK 122, ¶ 7, 540 P.2d 1161, 1164 (“The State Act has as its purpose
prohibition of personal restraints on individual employment effecting the right to act freely
and under no penalty or loss.”). Graham held that section 217 prohibited enforcement of a
forfeiture provision in the employer’s profit-sharing plan, triggered by an employee’s
resignation and employment by a competitor of the employer. Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 540 P.2d at 1164.
The plan was funded solely by contributions from the employer, and, according to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma in an earlier decided case,
the employee’s right to receive distributions of the funds allocated to his account during his
six-year employment had not vested. See Graham v. Hudgins, Thompson, Ball & Assocs.,
Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1335, 1336–38 (N.D. Okla. 1970). Nonetheless, Graham treated the funds
as compensation to which the employee was entitled and, noting that there was a split of
authority on the issue, adopted the “more acceptable view” followed in Ohio which treated
retirement benefits as part of an employee’s compensation. Graham, ¶¶ 10–11, 540 P.2d at
1164–65.
Graham is unique in its determination that after termination an employee can “act freely
and under no penalty or loss.” Id. ¶ 7, 540 P.2d at 1164. Decided before Bayly and after
Tatum, Graham did not consider whether the forfeiture provision was a reasonable restraint.
Graham is also unique in its observation that the Sherman Act deals with a subject matter
entirely different than section 217, i.e., monopolistic practices. Id.
The federal court had specifically decided that the forfeiture provision did not violate
section one of the Sherman Act. Graham, 319 F. Supp. at 1337. But it also decided that as a
covenant not to compete, there was no showing that the forfeiture provision restrained the
market for the employee’s services, and, therefore, no reason to analyze its reasonableness.
Id. “[T]he only restraint that appears to be imposed on [employee] is that of his desire for
payment of his inchoate share of the funds of the Plan. [Employee] makes no claim that this
forfeiture provision coerces any prospective employer into not hiring him.” Id. at 1337–38.
Bayly, and the cases on which it relies to invoke the rule of reason in section 217 cases,
make the Graham court’s distinction of federal law in this area no longer tenable.
150. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 51, 58 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
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“[t]here is no generally accepted principle of statutory interpretation that
shows that the courts were wrong to go this route.” 151
In any given market, the supply of workers and the demand for their
services can be described by a typical supply/demand curve, with the rate of
wages depicted on the vertical axis and the supply of workers depicted on
the horizontal axis.

$100

Wages

$0
0

100
Supply of employees

The “demand” curve for labor slopes down and to the right, representing
employers’ increased willingness to hire more employees as wages
decrease.152 The “supply” curve slopes up and to the right, indicating that
more employees are willing to work as wages increase. 153
151. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 35 (2d ed. 2001).
152. Matthew C. Palmer, Note, Where Have You Gone, Law and Economics Judges?
Economic Analysis Advice to Courts Considering the Enforceability of Covenants Not To
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According to one author, wages fall when courts refuse to enforce noncompete agreements.154 As depicted in the following graph, when
employers lack the protection of non-compete agreements, they are no
longer willing to pay the same wage that they would pay to an employee
who poses no threat of poaching the employer’s business upon termination
of the employment relationship.
$100

Wages

$0
0

100
Supply of employees

Compete Signed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1141
n.154 (2005).
153. Id.
154. See id. at 1146 (“Similarly, under an unenforceability ruling, the demand curve for
labor would shift downward.”); cf. Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition
Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 376
(2011) (predicting that enforcement of non-compete agreements would, (1) reduce mobility
but result in longer tenured executives, (2) result in lower but more salary-based
compensation for executives which would be offset by the employer’s increased investment
in training and educating its managers thereby raising the manager’s individual human
capital). This study does not attempt to quantify the economic value of longevity and better
trained and educated executives in terms of the overall compensation package received by
executives who are subject to enforceable non-compete agreements.
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Depending on the nature of the market, unemployment may rise, as the
equilibrium wage and number of employees who are willing to work for
that wage decrease. Regardless, additional costs “will be borne by
consumers as well as employers and employees.” 155 This is the kind of
adverse impact on competition and consumers that the antitrust laws are
designed to prevent. “[A]ntitrust [law] is not only or primarily a system to
ensure that business rivals do not behave unfairly or in a predatory manner
toward other businesses. It is rather a ‘consumer welfare’ system of
laws.”156
Because antitrust law focuses on competition as opposed to individual
competitors, it is difficult for an employee to show how being prevented
from doing the same job, with the same customers but for a different
employer, harms competition in the relevant market. This is especially true
because “[i]t is not enough for plaintiff to allege[] that he has been
injured—he must have suffered an antitrust injury.”157 From the consumers’
perspective, nothing changes when an employee changes employers; the
two employers continue to compete for the consumers’ business. There may
be economic consequences to the departing employee, but protecting
against those consequences at the expense of all other employees whose
wages are likely to suffer does not benefit consumers.
More importantly, courts seek to preserve competition between the two
employers. “The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately
competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and
services . . . the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether
competition is good or bad.”158 As long as the departing employee can
continue to practice their trade or profession, reasonable restraints on the
employee’s ability to compete with the former employer and necessary to
protect the former employer’s ability to compete with its competitors will
be enforced.159
155. Palmer, supra note 152, at 1147.
156. Robert Pitofsky, Introduction to HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK,
supra note 150, at 5.
157. Beville v. Curry, 2001 OK 1, ¶ 27, 39 P.3d 754, 764 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31 (1984)). Beville did not involve a contract between an
employer and an employee but an alleged conspiracy between a hospital and a prospective
employer by which the plaintiff was denied employment. Id. ¶¶ 2–3, 39 P.3d at 756–57.
Beville is relevant to section 217 because the damage issue regarding proof of an antitrust
injury would be the same. Id. ¶¶ 27–29, 39 P.3d at 764.
158. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
159. Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, ¶ 7, 465 P.2d 448, 451.
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IV. The Legacy of the “Tatum Rule”
Since Tatum was decided, twelve reported cases have applied section
217 to some form of post-employment restraint. In cases where the contract
prohibited an employee from soliciting the business of former customers,
courts consistently applied the “Tatum Rule” and enforced the restraint.160
However, in three cases, the court found that the contract restricted
customer solicitation to a greater degree than was permitted. In Bayly,
Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
prohibition was too broad to be judicially reformed because it also covered
prospective clients and all lines of insurance, including those that the
employee had not sold for the previous employer. 161 In Howard v. Nitro-Lift
Technologies, L.L.C., the court declined to modify the contract by limiting
the non-solicitation of “past or present” customers to present customers. 162
And the court held that it could not determine whether the contract’s
reference to “present customers” was equivalent to the “established
customers” language in the statute.163 Finally, in Autry v. Acosta, Inc., the
160. See, e.g., Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana, 2002 OK 27, ¶¶
19–20, 61 P.3d 210, 214–15; Inergy Propane, LLC v. Lundy, 2009 OK CIV APP 8, ¶¶ 31,
36, 50, 219 P.3d 547, 558, 560; Thayne A. Hedges Reg’l Speech & Hearing Ctr., Inc. v.
Baughman, 1998 OK CIV APP 122, ¶ 3, 996 P.2d 939, 941; Key Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Cox,
1994 OK CIV APP 123, ¶¶ 8–9, 17, 884 P.2d 1213, 1215–17.
For cases not involving a solicitation of former customers provision, see Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 19, 561 P.2d 499, 508 (holding the contract
between third parties to limit the number of employees hired did not violate section 217);
Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, 1981 OK 104, ¶¶ 11–18, 640 P.2d 948, 950–51 (holding an
agreement by manufacturer not to sell to customers of wholesaler did not violate section
217); Scanline Med., L.L.C. v. Brooks, 2011 OK CIV APP 88, ¶¶ 13–15, 259 P.3d 911,
913–14 (refusing to enforce a contract that prohibited the employee from selling competing
medical devices); Loewen Grp. Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 2000 OK CIV APP 109, ¶¶
22–24, 12 P.3d 977, 982 (refusing to enforce a contract prohibiting the employee from
owning or working for a competing business); Cohen Realty, Inc. v. Marinick, 1991 OK
CIV APP 71, ¶¶ 1, 8, 817 P.2d 747, 748–49 (refusing to enforce a contract that prevented the
employee from working as a real estate broker or “competing in any manner”).
161. 1989 OK 122, ¶¶ 16, 20, 780 P.2d 1168, 1174–75.
162. 2011 OK 98, ¶¶ 26–28, 273 P.3d 20, 29–30, vacated on other grounds, 568 U.S. 17
(2012) (per curiam). The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Opinion was vacated because its
analysis conflicted with federal law on an arbitration issue: who gets to decide whether a
non-compete agreement is enforceable, court or arbitrator. Nitro-Lift Techs., 568 U.S. at 20–
21. The United States Supreme Court determined that pursuant to federal law and the
parties’ arbitration agreement it was for the arbitrator, not the court, to determine the
enforceability of the non-compete agreement. Id. at 22.
163. Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, ¶¶ 26–28, 273 P.3d 20, 29–30.
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court declined to determine whether the contract prohibition on soliciting
the business of “Clients that [Employee] represented while employed” was
equivalent to the statutory “established customers” language. 164
The two latter cases involved the construction and application of title 15,
section 219A, which was enacted after Bayly was decided. The principal
focus of this Article concerns the effect of section 219A on the Tatum Rule,
the holding in Bayly, and antitrust analysis of post-employment restraints.
The Oklahoma Legislature enacted title 15, section 219A in 2001:
A. A person who makes an agreement with an employer,
whether in writing or verbally, not to compete with the employer
after the employment relationship has been terminated, shall be
permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted by
the former employer or in a similar business as that conducted by
the former employer as long as the former employee does not
directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a combination of
goods and services from the established customers of the former
employer.
B. Any provision in a contract between an employer and an
employee in conflict with the provisions of this section shall be
void and unenforceable. 165
The statute establishes a third statutory exception to the contracts
prohibited by section 217: soliciting the business of a former employer’s
established customers.166 The genesis for the statute appears to have been
Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews.167 Loewen involved a
prohibition on owning or operating a funeral home within fifteen miles of
any home owned by the former employer. 168 Because the employer owned
several funeral homes, the court found that the employee was effectively
164. 2018 OK CIV APP 8, ¶ 31, 410 P.3d 1017, 1023–24.
165. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(A) (2011); 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 406, § 4.
166. A fourth statutory exception was added in 2013 permitting agreements which
prohibit the solicitation of employees of a former employer to change employers. 15 OKLA.
STAT. § 219B (Supp. 2013); 2013 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 194, § 1. That exception deals
principally with unfair methods of competition and is beyond the scope of this Article.
167. See 2000 OK CIV APP 109, 12 P.3d 977; see also Jeb Boatman, Note, Contract
Law: As Clear as Mud: The Demise of the Covenant Not to Compete in Oklahoma, 55 OKLA.
L. REV. 491, 492 (2002).
168. Loewen, ¶ 3, 12 P.3d at 979.
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prevented from working anywhere in Oklahoma City, not just within fifteen
miles of the home where the employee had worked. 169
To date, section 219A has been subject to two competing interpretations.
Some courts interpret the statute as invalidating any post-employment
restraint between an employer and employee except one prohibiting the
departing employee from soliciting the business of the former employer’s
established customers. 170 According to this interpretation, the Legislature
intended to “change” existing law and only permit one kind of postemployment restraint. Such an interpretation would abandon the use of the
rule of reason.
An alternative interpretation argues that the statute was intended to
resolve one aspect of the third rule of reason factor—namely that the
procompetitive benefits of an agreement not to solicit established customers
outweigh its anticompetitive effects.171 According to this view, section
219A “codifies” the Tatum Rule but leaves the parties free to negotiate
other limitations on post-employment activities, subject to the rule of
reason.172
A. The “Change” Argument
One author has suggested that section 217 reflects the motto of the State
of Oklahoma, “Labor Omnia Vincit,”173 and represents an “employeefriendly” law.174 That view is consistent with the literal language of section
217 and the holdings in the two pre-Tatum cases: E. S. Miller Laboratories,
Inc. v. Griffin175 and Neal v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co.176 The change
interpretation implies that the Legislature intended to return to the pre169. Id. ¶ 18, 12 P.3d at 981.
170. See, e.g., Boatman, supra note 167, at 501 (noting that section 219A permits a
hands-off provision but “invalidates any other type of restrictive covenant between
employers and employees”); Green, supra note 126, at 462–63 (“[Section 219A] does not
allow employers to restrain the employee with noncompete agreements except for the
limited exception where ‘the employee may be barred from soliciting . . . established
customers.’”) (quoting Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, ¶ 21, 273 P.3d 20,
28, vacated on other grounds, 568 U.S. 17 (2012) (per curiam)).
171. See Inergy Propane, LLC v. Lundy, 2009 OK CIV APP 8, ¶ 28, 219 P.3d 547, 557.
172. Id. ¶¶ 24, 28, 219 P.3d at 556–57.
173. Translated as “labor conquers all.” ALBERT H. ELLIS, A HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 185 (1923), https://babel.
hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112105459467&view=1up&seq=211.
174. Green, supra note 126, at 459.
175. 1948 OK 149, ¶ 11, 194 P.2d 877, 879.
176. 1970 OK 13, ¶ 6, 480 P.2d 923, 924.
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Tatum days, eliminate any consideration of the reasonableness of a postemployment restraint, and avoid potentially inconsistent results by
prohibiting all restraints except the “hands-off-existing-customers” restraint
that was specifically approved in Tatum.177 To reach the change
interpretation, one must construe the first sentence of section 219A(A) and
section 219A(B) to mean that any post-employment restraint, other than a
hands-off-established-customers provision, prevents a departing employee
from engaging in “the same business as that conducted by the former
employer” and is void.178
B. The “Codification” Argument
The codification interpretation is supported by the proposition that if the
Legislature had intended to change existing law and return to the pre-Tatum
approach, it could have done so expressly. 179 The codification interpretation
views section 219A as a statutory effort to preserve one kind of postemployment restraint that had previously been deemed reasonable—the
hands-off-existing-customers restraint—but to have done so within the
broader context of the post-Tatum case law.180 This interpretation relies on
traditional statutory construction and points out various inconsistencies and
unintended results, including conflict with federal law, that adoption of the
change interpretation would likely create. The codification interpretation
reads the first sentence of section 219A as resonating the holding in Tatum;
if the post-employment restraint does not absolutely prevent the departing
employee from engaging in the same business as the employer and the
restraint is otherwise reasonable, it is enforceable.
V. The Proper Construction of Section 219A
The change and codification interpretations of section 219A cannot be
reconciled. This Article argues that the codification interpretation is
sounder than the change interpretation and the more legally supported
interpretation of the statute. Three reasons support this conclusion: (1)
traditional principles of statutory construction, (2) the unintended
177. See Green, supra note 126, at 459–62.
178. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(A) (2011).
179. See Boatman, supra note 167, at 512 (“In addition, if the legislature intended a
return to a strict interpretation, like the standard used in Miller, for restrictive covenants not
directly addressed by section 219A, it should pass a clear legislative directive to Oklahoma
courts to abandon the rule of reason analysis for covenants not addressed by section 219A.”).
180. See Green, supra note 126, at 462–63.
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consequences that would result from adopting the change interpretation,
and (3) the potential for conflict with federal law.
A. Statutory Construction
The subject matter of section 219A was the focus of litigation and legal
interpretation for decades prior to enactment. Given that history, the first
question to resolve in applying the 2001 statute is whether the Legislature
sought to abrogate that historical body of law when it enacted section 219A.
[B]y amending a statute the Legislature may have intended (1) to
change existing law or (2) to clarify ambiguous law. The exact
intent is ascertained by looking to the circumstances surrounding
the amendment. If the earlier version of a statute definitely
expresses a clear and unambiguous intent or has been judicially
interpreted, a legislative amendment is presumed to change the
existing law. Nonetheless, if the earlier statute’s meaning is in
doubt or uncertain, a presumption arises that the amendment is
designed to clarify, i.e., more clearly convey, legislative intent
which was left indefinite by the earlier statute’s text. 181
If one interprets section 219A to prohibit any post-employment restraint
in an employment contract other than one preventing a departing employee
from directly soliciting the business of the former employer’s established
customers, then one must assume the Legislature intended to change the
existing interpretation of section 217. But the Legislature chose to enact
section 219A as a separate statute, rather than amend section 217.
Numerous judicial decisions have subjected section 217 to a rule of
reason type approach since 1970. Consequently, it is significant that the
Legislature did not clearly state an intention to abrogate use of the rule of
reason in section 217 cases when it enacted section 219A. As the Oklahoma
Supreme Court recognized in Couch v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, “[f]ailure of the Legislature to change the law for a long period
of time after judicial construction thereof amounts to Legislative approval
and ratification of the construction placed upon the statute by the Court.”182
In addition, the change interpretation requires the addition of language to
section 219A. The phrase “shall be permitted to engage in the same
181. Samman v. Multiple Injury Tr. Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 302, 307 (footnotes
omitted).
182. 1956 OK 239, ¶ 6, 302 P.2d 117, 119 (per curiam) (citing McCain v. State Election
Bd., 1930 OK 323, 289 P. 759).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/2

2020]

OKLAHOMA’S POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINT LAW

785

business as that conducted by the former employer” must be interpreted to
mean that any post-employment restraint, except a hands-off-existingcustomers provision, prevents an employee from engaging in the same
business as the employer.183 But language expressing that interpretation is
nowhere to be found in section 219A, “[a]nd[] the general rule is that
nothing may be read into a statute which was not within the manifest
intention of the legislature as gathered from the language of the act.”184 If
the Legislature intended to prohibit any post-employment restraint except
the one mentioned in section 219A, the Legislature could have done so in a
clearer and more direct way. For example, the Legislature could have
worded the statute to provide that “all post-employment restraints except a
hands-off-existing-customers provision are void.” It did not.
In fact, the statute specifically contemplates covenants by which the
employee agrees not to engage in other kinds of competitive conduct when
it discusses “[a] person who makes an agreement with an employer . . . not
to compete with the employer after the employment relationship has been
terminated.”185 The only statutory limitation imposed on an “agreement . . .
not to compete” is that the employer cannot prevent the departing employee
from engaging in the same or a similar business. 186 Consequently, an
employee subject to this kind of non-compete agreement can engage in the
same business as long as he or she does not compete with the former
employer and, if included in the employment contract, “directly solicit the
sale of goods, services or a combination of goods and services from the
established customers of the former employer.” 187 This interpretation is
grammatically consistent with the language of the statute and does not
depend on the addition of language not included in the statute. 188 And this
interpretation would preserve rule of reason analysis but leave the question
of whether any other types of restraints are prohibited by section 217 for
future determination.
183. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(A).
184. Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 1956 OK 221, ¶ 19, 301 P.2d 212,
216.
185. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(A).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Warren v. Stanfield (In re Guardianship of Stanfield), 2012 OK 8, ¶ 11, 276 P.3d
989, 994 (“When determining the meaning of an unambiguous statute, the ordinary rules of
grammar must be applied unless they lead to an absurd result.”) (citing Gilbert Cent. Corp.
v. State, 1986 OK 6, 716 P.2d 654).
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But, in a jurisprudential vacuum, even this interpretation of section 219A
could lead to undesirable results. For example, the hands-off-establishedcustomers provision in section 219A(A) is not limited to the goods and
services sold by the former employer. Nonetheless, an employer should not
be able to prevent a departing employee from attempting to sell to anyone,
including the former employer’s established customers, goods or services
that the former employer does not sell. Yet the change interpretation would
permit the employer to engage in this kind of overreaching and ultimately
anticompetitive conduct.
The change interpretation essentially reads section 219A as a
replacement for section 217. That interpretation would be on firmer
analytical ground if, for example, the statute provided: Every contract by
which one is restrained from practicing a trade or profession is void, except
one prohibiting an employee from soliciting the sale of goods, services or a
combination of goods and services from the established customers of the
former employer. The codification interpretation avoids the unintended
consequences of that kind of language by construing section 217, as
interpreted by the Tatum line of cases, alongside section 219A and giving
effect to each statute.189 According to this view, section 217 permits
reasonable post-employment restraints, and section 219A provides that a
hands-off-established-customers covenant is reasonable. But the
codification interpretation also leads to the conclusion that an agreement
which prevents a departing employee from engaging in a completely
different business with a former employer’s “established customers” has no
procompetitive benefits.190
Finally, the language in section 219A that authorizes a hands-offestablished-customers covenant fails to address the location and duration
limitations that have previously been held to be necessary for such a postemployment restraint to be enforceable. For example, section 219A does
not impose any reasonable time limit for the enforcement of a restraint and
could therefore apply indefinitely.191 The rule of reason prevents that result.

189. See Okla. Nat. Gas Co. v. State ex rel. Vassar, 1940 OK 137, ¶ 10, 101 P.2d 793,
796 (noting that statutes regarding the same subject are to be construed so as to give effect to
every part and harmonize each section with the others).
190. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(A).
191. Similar issues have been noted in other contexts, for example, applying the same
rule to high-level managers with little or no customer contact that is applied to employees
with direct customer contact. See Memorandum from Gary W. Derrick, Subcommittee
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The change argument does not and would require courts to read a
reasonableness test into the statute for certain aspects of the analysis where
the existing statutory language does not resolve the issue. If, as the change
interpretation requires, section 219A can be implemented from the language
of the statute alone and without reference to the rule of reason, no principle
of statutory construction is available to create exceptions for what the
statute leaves out. But it is fundamental that statutory construction must
“begin with consideration of the language used and courts should not read
into a statute exceptions not made by the Legislature.”192 If the Legislature
abrogated use of the rule of reason for interpreting section 217, it also
abrogated use of that rule to determine the reasonableness of a particular
hands-off provision covered by section 219A.
As a matter of statutory construction, therefore, it is more likely that the
Legislature intended to “more clearly convey” one of the judicially created
exceptions to section 217 when it enacted section 219A, thus codifying the
hands-off-existing-customers covenant of the Tatum Rule. 193 That
construction also avoids problematic results that the Legislature likely did
not intend to create.
B. Unintended Consequences of the Change Interpretation
The change construction of section 219A would also conflict with longsettled issues regarding the interpretation of section 218. For example, a
corporate employee who owns company stock can agree not to solicit
established or potential customers upon termination of the employment
relationship and sale of stock back to the corporation. 194 That kind of
agreement has been consistently upheld.195 Although the sale of good will
Chair, to the Bus. Ass’ns Section of the Okla. Bar Ass’n (June 27, 2001) (on file with
author); see also Boatman, supra note 167, at 510–11.
192. Ledbetter v. Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enf’t Comm’n, 1988 OK 117, ¶ 7, 764
P.2d 172, 179.
193. See Samman v. Multiple Injury Tr. Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 302, 307
(discussing general statutory interpretation principles).
194. Compare Key v. Perkins, 1935 OK 142, ¶¶ 3, 14, 46 P.2d 530, 531–32 (finding the
sale of twenty percent of the corporation’s stock found sufficient to enforce the restrictions),
with Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 1989 OK 122, ¶ 9, 780 P.2d 1168, 1170 (finding
the sale of a “miniscule amount of stock—.08%” insufficient to invoke the goodwill
exception in sections 217 and 218).
195. Berry & Berry Acquisitions v. BFN Props. LLC, 2018 OK 27, ¶ 16, 416 P.3d 1061,
1069. Berry settles a previously assumed but unresolved issue of Oklahoma law. See Oliver
v. Omnicare, Inc., 2004 OK CIV APP 93, ¶¶ 6, 14, 103 P.3d 626, 629–30 (holding that

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

788

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:755

associated with the company’s stock has historically been viewed as a
section 218 case,196 a partial stock sale accompanied by a general noncompete agreement is a “provision in a contract between an employer and
an employee in conflict with the provisions of [section 219A].” 197 As the
Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized in Hogg v. Oklahoma County
Juvenile Bureau, “[w]hen a strict literal construction leads to an
inconsistent or incongruent result between provisions, we will utilize rules
of statutory construction to reconcile the discord and ascertain the
legislative intent.”198
The change interpretation also creates a conflict between section 217 and
Oklahoma’s general antitrust statute.199 Although section 217 addresses
contracts that restrain the practice of a trade or profession, both statutes
address contracts that restrain trade. 200 Although the antitrust statute is
clearly interpreted pursuant to the antitrust rule of reason, 201 the change
interpretation would apply a different analytical rule to contracts which
restrain the practice of a lawful trade or profession.
Oklahoma public policy prevented enforcement of non-compete agreement despite Ohio
choice of law provision in the employment contract); Herchman v. Sun Med., Inc., 751 F.
Supp. 942, 947 (N.D. Okla. 1990) (finding that a non-compete agreement in a Texas
employment contract violated Oklahoma public policy and was unenforceable in
Oklahoma). The public policy issue in Berry was whether a restrictive covenant clearly
enforceable pursuant to the Texas choice of law provision in an employment contract
“violates the public policy of Oklahoma—a determination that hinges on the whether the
non-compete is enforceable under Oklahoma law.” Berry, ¶ 14, 416 P.3d at 1068–69. As a
result, without respect to the enforceability of a restrictive covenant pursuant to the law of
any other state chosen by the parties to govern an employment contract, if the covenant
violates Oklahoma antitrust law, it will not be enforced in this State.
196. See, e.g., Bayly, ¶ 13 n.11, 780 P.2d at 1172 n.11.
197. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(B) (2011).
198. 2012 OK 107, ¶ 7, 292 P.3d 29, 33 (citing St. John Med. Ctr. v. Bilby, 2007 OK 37,
¶ 6, 160 P.3d 978, 979).
199. See 79 OKLA. STAT. § 203 (2011).
200. Compare 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217 (“Every contract by which any one is restrained
from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as
provided by Sections 218 and 219 of this title, or otherwise than as provided by Section 2 of
this act, is to that extent void.”), with 79 OKLA. STAT. § 203(A) (“Every . . . contract . . . in
restraint of trade or commerce within this state is hereby declared to be against public policy
and illegal.”).
201. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶¶ 15–18, 561
P.2d 499, 505–08; see also 79 OKLA. STAT. § 212 (“The provisions of this act shall be
interpreted in a manner consistent with Federal Antitrust Law 15 U.S.C., Section 1 et seq.
and the case law applicable thereto.”).
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C. Conflict with Federal Law
The change argument further produces a conflict between section 217
and federal antitrust law. The Sherman Act applies to restraints of trade
“among the several States, or with foreign nations.”202 In adopting the
Sherman Act, “Congress meant to deal comprehensively and effectively
with the evils resulting from contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of trade, and to that end to exercise all the power it possessed.” 203
Further, “as the dimensions and complexity of our economy have grown,
the federal power over commerce, and the concomitant coverage of the
Sherman Act, have experienced similar expansion.”204 As Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause has long been interpreted to extend to
local activities that substantially affect interstate commerce as well as
activities actually occurring in interstate commerce, 205 it has become clear
“that the jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act may be satisfied
under either the ‘in commerce’ or the ‘effect on commerce’ theory.” 206
It is now rare to find a business that does not involve or effect interstate
commerce. 207 Consequently, where the Sherman Act applies, a postemployment restraint prohibiting solicitation of business from established
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
203. Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
204. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328–29 (1991) (footnote omitted).
205. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
206. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (citing
Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Tr., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976); Gulf Oil Co. v. Copp Paving
Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 194–95 (1974); United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfr. Ass’n,
336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 235–37 (1948)).
207. See, e.g., Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 329 (holding that although a hospital’s
primary activity was providing health care services in a local market, an excluded
ophthalmologist showed that the hospital was engaged in interstate commerce for Sherman
Act jurisdiction); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435–36 (1990)
(holding a group refusal to accept appointments of indigent defendants by private practice
attorneys in the District of Columbia was a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Arizona v.
Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (holding that an agreement by
physicians not to exceed maximum fee schedule established for patients in one particular
county in Arizona was a per se violation of the Sherman Act); McLain, 444 U.S. at 245
(holding that real estate brokerage activity facilitating local real estate transactions had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce satisfying Sherman Act jurisdictional requirement);
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783–85 (1975) (finding that title examination by
local attorneys as part of real estate transactions was an integral part of interstate commerce
for Sherman Act jurisdiction).
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customers—even if sanctioned by section 219A—will still have to satisfy a
federal rule of reason analysis to be enforceable. 208 The following example
illustrates the problem.
When executed, an employment contract that contains a postemployment restrictive covenant is similar to a vertical restraint. The
employee agrees not to work for a competitor during the term of
employment. But the agreement does not raise any antitrust issues because
the contract is analogous to an exclusive dealing arrangement between a
manufacturer and its distributor, or a wholesaler and its retailer. In addition,
the employer generally lacks market power to adversely affect competition
in the relevant market as a result of the contract.209 If an employee subject
to a section 219A-type “hands off” non-compete agreement leaves and goes
to work for the employer’s competitor, the “vertical” nature of the
agreement does not change—it is still an agreement between an employer
and a former employee. It does not become a horizontal agreement between
the former employer and the new employer merely because the employee
takes existing contractual obligations to the new employment. And the
agreement would be generally enforceable, regardless of whether federal
law or Oklahoma law applies.
However, if the employee leaves and starts a competing business, the
non-compete agreement becomes a “horizontal restraint,” that is, one
between two competitors at the same market level. 210 A market division
agreement between competitors withdraws the “supply” of potential sellers
and raises prices.211 An agreement between competitors to divide territories,
or in the case of a non-compete agreement, to divide customers within a
relevant market would violate both federal and State antitrust laws. 212
208. See OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“The State of Oklahoma is an inseparable part of the
Federal Union, and the constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land.”).
209. See Beville v. Curry, 2001 OK 1, ¶ 13, 39 P.3d 754, 759–60 (requiring proof of
market power to establish antitrust injury in the absence of actual adverse effects on
competition).
210. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
211. ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW
AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 236 (5th ed. 1994).
212. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 295–96 (6th Cir. 1898)
(finding agreement among competitors to allocate geographical territories and some
customers within those territories exclusively to each competitor violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, 1981 OK 104, ¶¶
9–11, 640 P.2d 948, 950–51 (following federal law); see also Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc.,
498 U.S. 46, 47, 49–50 (1990) (per curiam) (holding an agreement by bar review companies
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The change interpretation of section 219A forecloses this method of
analysis and would enforce a hands-off-established-customers non-compete
agreement even though the former employee’s new business might offer a
lower price, better service, or improved product. This result becomes even
more problematic when one considers that “[l]ow prices benefit consumers
regardless of how those prices are set.” 213 “The assumption that competition
is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that
all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—and not
just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to
select among alternative offers.”214 Application of the change interpretation
to this example would produce an obviously problematic result from both a
federal antitrust law and supremacy clause perspective.
Further, even if such a non-compete agreement is treated as a horizontal
agreement, the employer may still be able to show that there are
procompetitive benefits to consumers that outweigh the anticompetitive
effects. Although the change interpretation of section 219A forecloses that
debate, the rule of reason analysis does not. “In its design and function the
rule [of reason] distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect
that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that
are in the consumer’s best interest.” 215
A different example clearly illuminates the difference between the
change interpretation of section 219A and a rule of reason analysis. Assume
an automobile salesperson employed by a high-end, luxury new car dealer
is subject to a section 219A type hands-off-existing-customers agreement.
If the salesperson leaves and goes to work in the relevant market for a
not to compete in each other’s designated territory to be illegal); Topco, 405 U.S. at 608
(holding an agreement by supermarket owners to operate only in their exclusive territory to
be illegal); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 354–56 (1967) (holding an agreement
by competitors who owned manufacturer to sell its products only in their assigned territories
to be illegal); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (describing agreements
to divide markets by competitors as per se illegal). Market division agreements between
competitors have generally been treated as per se offenses. However, in Rothery Storage &
Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court applied a rule
of reason analysis after concluding that Topco and Sealy had been overruled. In Palmer, the
Court’s citation to Topco for the proposition that market division agreements by competitors
are “classic examples” of a per se antitrust violation strongly suggests that Topco has not
been overruled. Palmer, 498 U.S. at 49 (quoting Topco, 405 U.S. at 608).
213. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990).
214. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
215. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).
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competitor in the high-end, luxury new car market, the first employer is
entitled to enforce the non-compete agreement and prevent the salesman
from contacting that employer’s established customers, regardless of
whether the change or codification interpretation of section 219A is
followed.
However, if the salesperson leaves and goes to work for a used truck
dealer, the first employer would still be entitled to enforce the non-compete
agreement pursuant to the change interpretation of section 219A. But
because this business would likely satisfy the interstate commerce
jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act, federal law would mandate a
rule of reason analysis. The rule of reason analysis would focus on the
difference between the high-end, luxury new car market and the used truck
market to determine whether they were in the same or different product
markets. If the court established they comprised two different product
markets, the first employer would bear the burden to show that there were
procompetitive benefits that outweighed the anticompetitive effects of
enforcing the non-compete agreement. Because a high-end, new car dealer
is unlikely to have an interest in customers seeking to purchase used trucks,
the non-compete agreement would presumably fail the rule of reason
analysis and be held unenforceable. 216
Unlike the change argument, the codification interpretation would
harmonize the construction of section 219A with federal antitrust law and
avoid inconsistent outcomes that would entirely depend upon the existence
or absence of interstate commerce. The codification interpretation also
honors the intent of the Antitrust Reform Act to align Oklahoma antitrust
law “consistent with Federal Antitrust Law 15 U.S.C., Section 1 et seq. and
the case law applicable thereto.”217
VI. Judicial Interpretation of Section 219A
To date, six cases have addressed the application of section 219A. 218 To
read these cases in anything other than the historical context of section 217
216. Cf. Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana, 2002 OK 27, ¶ 18, 61
P.3d 210, 214 (“One surgeon has no legitimate business interest in another surgeon’s referral
base regardless of a past employer-employee relationship.”).
217. 79 OKLA. STAT. § 212 (2011).
218. See Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, ¶¶ 6, 23, 273 P.3d 20, 24, 29
(holding a prohibition on employment with any company in the same business in the United
States held unenforceable), vacated on other grounds, 568 U.S. 17 (2012); Mammana, ¶ 19
n.5, 61 P.3d at 214 n.5; Autry v. Acosta, Inc., 2018 OK CIV APP 8, ¶ 32, 410 P.3d 1017,
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jurisprudence risks the “inconsistent or incongruent” results to be avoided
in statutory construction. 219 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals made the
following observation in Inergy Propane, LLC v. Lundy:
Section 219A was not enacted in a vacuum. Nor does the
language of the statute evidence any legislative intent to supplant
the existing and extensive case law interpreting section 217.
Those cases and the analytical approach developed therein
provide the context within which to resolve the issues not
specifically addressed by the language of section 219A. What
the statute does eliminate is the need for part of the rule of
reason analysis. . . . [T]he pro-competitive benefits of an
agreement between an employer and an employee preventing the
employee from “directly solicit[ing] the sale of goods, services
or a combination of goods and services from the established
customers of the former employer” after termination of the
employment outweigh the anti-competitive effects of that
agreement.220
The Court’s interpretation of section 219A in Lundy is consistent with
the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s approach in Cardiovascular Surgical
Specialists Corporation v. Mammana.221 The third aspect of the noncompete provision in that case provided that the employee would not
“solicit or divert business of any patient who had been a patient of
Cardiovascular within one year of the termination, without
Cardiovascular’s advanced written consent.”222 The Mammana court held
that this non-compete provision was “consistent with the Legislature's

1023–24 (holding a prohibition on engaging in the same business unenforceable); Scanline
Med., L.L.C. v. Brooks, 2011 OK CIV APP 88, ¶¶ 12–15, 259 P.3d 911, 913–14 (holding a
prohibition on selling competing medical devices in the United States unenforceable); Inergy
Propane, LLC v. Lundy, 2009 OK CIV APP 8, ¶¶ 24–28, 219 P.3d 547, 555–57; Eakle v.
Grinnell Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1310, 1313 (E.D. Okla. 2003) (noting that, after
extensive discussion, section 219A was not applicable but still holding a broad prohibition
on post-employment competition in employment agreement enforceable because part of a
stock sale).
219. Hogg v. Okla. Cty. Juvenile Bureau, 2012 OK 107, ¶ 7, 292 P.3d 29, 33.
220. Lundy, ¶ 28, 219 P.3d at 557.
221. See Mammana, ¶¶ 14–20, 61 P.3d at 213–15 (interpreting section 217).
222. Id. ¶ 15, 61 P.3d at 214.
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recent enactment [of section 219A] concerning noncompetition
agreements.”223
In Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C., the Oklahoma Supreme
Court commented on the Lundy decision: “The [Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals] determined, at least in some instances, the rule of reason would be
applicable even under the confines of [section 219A]. It held that the statute
addressed the balance of competitive effects under a rule of reason analysis
finding the non-solicitation agreement enforceable.”224
In Lundy, the Court of Civil Appeals used a rule of reason approach to
determine the enforceability of a hands-off-existing-customers non-compete
agreement.225 Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not repudiate or
overrule the Lundy analysis in Nitro-Lift, the court did note that Lundy was
“persuasive only and lack[ed] precedential effect.” 226
In Nitro-Lift, the Supreme Court analyzed a restrictive covenant that
prohibited a departing employee from working for any other company
engaged in the same business as the employer for a period of two years and
also prohibited solicitation of past and present customers. 227 The Nitro-Lift
court interpreted section 219A in the following way:
It provides that where an employee has executed a covenant not
to compete with an employer, the employee “shall be permitted
to engage in the same business as that conducted by the
former employer or in a similar business as that conducted
by the former employer as long as the former employee does
not directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a

223. Id. ¶ 19 n.5, 61 P.3d at 214 n.5. Because Dr. Mammana signed the contract before
section 219A became effective, it is not clear whether the Court was applying the “new” law
or merely acknowledging its existence. The Court did not engage in an analysis of the
statute’s retroactive effect. However, it is noteworthy that section 219A became effective
after the case was tried but before the appellate decision was rendered. And, there are wellsettled legal principles which would justify retroactive application of the statute. See, e.g.,
Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 43, 305 P.3d 1004; Wickham v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
1981 OK 8, 623 P.2d 613. “[Section] 219A is the Legislature’s pronouncement on
Oklahoma’s public policy regarding covenants not to compete.” Nitro-Lift Techs., ¶ 20, 273
P.3d at 28 (footnote omitted).
224. Nitro-Lift Techs., ¶ 1 n.3, 273 P.3d at 23 n.3.
225. Lundy, ¶ 28, 219 P.3d at 557.
226. Nitro-Lift Techs., ¶ 1 n.3, 273 P.3d at 23 n.3.
227. Id. ¶ 6, 273 P.3d at 24.
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combination of goods and services from the established
customers of the former employer.” 228
According to Nitro-Lift, section 219A was enacted to “prohibit[]
employers from binding employees to agreements which bar their ability to
find gainful employment in the same business or industry as that of the
employer.”229 Although stated differently, this is essentially the same
concern expressed forty years earlier by the Tatum court: “[T]he contractual
provision in the present case does not, in any manner or to any extent
whatsoever, restrain the defendant from exercising a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind whatsoever, either in competition with the
plaintiff or otherwise.”230 What differentiates the two decisions is their use
of rule of reason analysis. The former did not utilize such analysis, relying
on statutory construction to resolve the case; the latter introduced rule of
reason analysis to Oklahoma law along with judicial balancing of the
legitimate interests of employers and employees in particular cases in the
service of economic competition for the ultimate benefit of consumers.
Conclusion
In 1911, the United States Supreme Court observed that in a span of less
than one hundred years, the changing economic environment had
transformed market practices that had been deemed harmful at common law
into procompetitive benefits.231 As the Court recognized, “contracts or
acts . . . at one time deemed to be of such a character as to justify the
inference of [competitive harm] . . . were at another period thought not to
be of that character.”232 Moreover, it is not just the law’s view of particular
business conduct that has changed—the growth in complexity of our
modern economy has manifested a similar expansion in “the federal power
over commerce, and the concomitant coverage of the Sherman Act.” 233
Section 219A, when interpreted in accordance with section 217
jurisprudence, statutorily permits one kind of post-employment restraint
that had previously been determined reasonable. Pursuant to that
interpretation, section 219A codifies the “hands-off-existing-customers”
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. ¶ 20, 273 P.3d at 28 (quoting 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A).
Id. ¶ 21, 273 P.3d at 28.
Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, ¶ 7, 465 P.2d 448, 451.
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57–58 (1911).
Id. at 58–59.
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328–29 (1991) (footnote omitted).
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part of the Tatum Rule and protects competition by encouraging employers
“to employ the ablest assistants, and to instruct them thoroughly.” 234 At the
same time, consumers benefit from the limitation that section 219A permits
because departing employees may “find gainful employment in the same
business or industry as that of the employer.” 235 Because section 219A
codified a specific exception to the prohibition on post-employment
restraints in section 217, rather than replacing section 217, the rule of
reason provides safeguards against those post-employment restraints not
specifically authorized by section 219A.
Although Oklahoma law on post-employment restraints is not policy
neutral, it does not necessarily “disfavor” such restraints. In the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court established a policy preference in favor of
agreements that benefit consumers and competition, based on a choice to
embrace one economic system over the alternatives. What benefits
consumers depends, to some extent, on evolving economic principles and
changes in the way people conduct business. The challenge of the law in
this area, is (as it has historically been) to adapt fundamental legal
principles to current market conditions. A flexible application of the rule of
reason has successfully accomplished that adaption in the past, and there is
no reason why it cannot continue to do so.

234. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
235. Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, ¶ 21, 273 P.3d 20, 28, vacated on
other grounds, 568 U.S. 17 (2012) (per curiam) (citing Scanline Med., L.L.C. v. Brooks,
2011 OK CIV APP 88, 259 P.3d 911).
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